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An Improbable Identification? The Netherlands as a “Reference





This paper investigated a policy-making debate in Chile, by examining the
construction of the Netherlands as a new “reference society”. It focused on
a reform agenda that aimed at a transformation of the neo-liberal school
governance model. Based on the analysis of government documents, par-
liamentary debates, and media materials, the paper concludes that in add-
ition to the consideration of PISA results the identification with the
Netherlands served fundamentally as a political compromise solution.
Introduction
The discussion over the so-called “ley de inclusion” (inclusion law) of the center-left government
of Michelle Bachelet (2014–2018) is arguably one of the most controversial policy-making debates
on reform agendas Chile has seen in recent decades. The context of the debate was a very disrup-
tive and critical phase of intense questioning of the education system. As a result of a massive
student movement as well as international pressure, an education reform agenda was launched
which, for the first time since the end of the military dictatorship (1973–1990), sought structural
change in one of the most privatized, commodified, and deregulated school educational govern-
ance model in the world (Verger, 2014). The reformatory target of the “ley de inclusion” was the
voucher-based quasi-market, which then had existed for more than 35 years, specifically the subsi-
dized private schools. With regard to these schools, the reform agenda aimed to end profit-
making (lucro), student selection (seleccion), and school fees (copago). Although the agenda also
included the de-municipalization of public schools and free higher education, the debate on the
“ley de inclusion” turned out to be the most controversial. In fact, a hitherto unprecedented dis-
pute took place involving not only government officials, opposition parties, related think tanks,
media, academics, teachers’ associations, social movements, and the media, but also private
schools and parents’ associations. But what was new was not only the radical objective and the
controversial nature of the dispute. It was also striking that the debate showed an almost compul-
sive tendency towards external reference construction - from the Netherlands to Finland.
Studies on the transfer of ideas, reforms, and organizational models from one context to
another have experienced inflationary growth for quite some time in comparative education
research (Phillips & Ochs, 2003; Steiner-Khamsi, 2012; Waldow, 2012). What unites these studies,
despite their different terminology, is a fundamental change of perspective by focusing primarily
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on national or local contexts in order to investigate the adoption and recontextualization of global
models and policies by national and local actors. Based on this shift in perspective, these studies
were able to address globalization hypotheses with critical evidence, such as the “world culture”
theory in neo-institutionalist terms (Schriewer & Martınez, 2004).
Within this perspective, recent studies examine how international organizations and inter-
national large-scale assessments (ILSA) such as the Program for International Student Assessment
(PISA) and rankings contribute significantly to the reference construction of some nations
(Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2018; Waldow & Steiner-Khamsi, 2019). Using the concept of
“reference society”, they specifically examine “how top scorers in ILSA are framed as “positive or
negative reference societies” in the education-policy-making debate (e.g., Waldow, 2010; Sellar &
Lingard, 2013; Steiner-Khamsi, 2014; Adamson, Forestier, Morris, & Han, 2017; Lingard,
Martino, & Rezai-Rashti, 2016; Takayama, 2018). Interestingly, very few of these studies have
focused on the Latin American context (e.g., Parcerisa & Verger, 2019).
Based on these studies, the aim of this paper is to investigate the dynamics of external reference
construction in the context of controversial policy-making debates in a certain Latin American
country. In particular, it will be examined how, why, and with what purpose the Netherlands was
constructed as a “positive reference society” (Waldow, 2017) in the Chilean context. I consider the
analysis of this policy-making debate to be useful because of the following factors:
1. From a thematic point of view, the study of the above-mentioned debate is very informative
because it highlighted a possible educational policy “way out” from the neo-liberal path that
the country has been taking for almost four decades. In fact, Chile has the most radical, far-
reaching and long-lasting market and competition-based education governance model in the
world (Verger & Bonal, 2016, 3). Numerous empirical educational studies have therefore
devoted analysis to this exceptional case (e.g., McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Hsieh & Urquiola,
2006; Verger, 2016). Moreover, the Chilean quasi-market model was presented during the
1990s by international organizations such as the World Bank as a prototype (West, 1997) for
equivalent reform programs in other countries (Diaz Rios, 2018). The analysis of this policy-
making debate therefore elucidates how the former “laboratory of neo-liberalism” put “de-
commodification of education” at the top of the political agenda for the first time
(Verger, 2014).
2. In theoretical-methodological terms, this case sheds new light on the conceptual research on
external policy referencing in comparative education. It shows how controversial policy-
making debates in the context of disruptive crises can instigate social identification processes
with new international reference points, in this case with the Netherlands, but also with
Finland. But why did the Chilean reformers prefer to turn to the Dutch education system
rather than the Finnish one? Based on this case, it will be shown that, besides ILSA, local fac-
tors, in particular specific power constellations, continue to play a decisive role in external
reference construction.
In a theoretical-methodological sense, this paper follows the so-called “externalization thesis”.
This refers to the reference and the selective transformation process of educational organization
patterns, traditions of thought, and political trends into arguments used in domestic policy-
making debates (Schriewer, 1988; Schriewer, 2007). “Externalization on world situations” specific-
ally implies the reference to an “external point”, either a national “reference society”, or an
“international organization, process or discourse” (Waldow, 2012, 419). These reference proce-
dures basically seek to legitimize (or delegitimize) the political positions of a country, a party, or
an organization within highly contentious policy-making debates (Schriewer, 1988; Waldow,
2012; Steiner-Khamsi, 2014; Alarcon, 2015). In the empirical sense, this thesis demands thorough
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analyses of socio-cultural contexts in which, amid reform pressure, “reference societies” are
semantically constructed.
In this paper I would like to connect the term “reference society” with the psychological con-
cept of “identification”. The term is intended to explain the mechanism of reference construction.
Identification refers to adopting norms, attitudes, and behaviors from a respected or admired
group (Smith, 2007, 835). I will distinguish between two identification modalities: identification
as an operation of recognition, of putting-oneself-in-the-country (Fr€ohlich, 1994, 212), and identi-
fication as a concrete adoption (assimilation) of motives, attitudes (norms) of the “model” (Ritter,
1976, 135). The following arguments are laid out in this paper:
1. The Chilean identification process with the Netherlands followed pragmatic-strategic consid-
erations, in which PISA results were an important factor, but not the decisive one.
2. The Netherlands was used to argue for the “normalization” and “humanization” of the priva-
tized school system.
3. The “Dutch argument” ultimately served as a political compromise solution.
The empirical basis for the analysis is made up of three types of sources: government docu-
ments, parliamentary debates, and print, TV, and online media. The media analysis focused on
the newspaper El Mercurio, which covers the right-wing conservative spectrum, the right-wing
liberal newspaper La Tercera, as well as, digital media, elmostrador.cl, ciper.cl, and udechile.cl,
which are more likely to be assigned to a left-wing progressive field. Furthermore, the web-sites
of the news broadcasters CNN Chile and 24 horas were also reviewed.
First, as part of an historical examination, I will discuss the most important measures of the
educational reform of the military dictatorship. Then, I will outline the discursive content of the
reform agenda of President Michelle Bachelet and address the motivations, interests, and alliances
of key players in the policy-making debate. In the following section I will reconstruct the “Dutch
argument”. To do this, several discursive motives will be identified, and I will examine what ideas
and principles different actors in the policy-making debate associated with the Netherlands. After
that, I will discuss the “Dutch argument” considering the educational history and tradition of the
Netherlands. This will then be compared with the Chilean view of Finland, because the reference
to Finland also played an important role in Chile, albeit to a much lesser extent than the
Netherlands. Subsequently, I will analyze and justify the thesis of the “Dutch argument” as a pol-
itical compromise solution. I close the paper with a discussion of the most important results.
An Historical Review
About 60% of all Chilean students currently attend private schools. This puts the country at the
top of all OECD countries, where, on average, only 10% of students attend private schools
(OECD, 2014a, 5). Chile is also a leader in private education in the Latin American context
(OECD, 2014a, 5). However, a historical retrospective shows that the situation was almost the
opposite some 40 years ago. In 1980, 78% of students attended schools run by the state
(Corvalan, Elacqua, & Salazar, 2009, 12).
To understand this dramatic reversal, a reference to the educational reform of the military dic-
tatorship is necessary. As part of this regime, a so-called “neo-liberal” restructuring was carried
out. The authoritarian conditions of the dictatorship represented “ideal” laboratory conditions for
this restructuring (Verger, 2016). Its ideological originators were the so-called “Chicago Boys”.
The term “Chicago Boys” refers to their common denominator: almost all the group’s members
had acquired market oriented economic theories during their studies at the University of
Chicago, notably those of Milton Friedman, Gary Becker, and Friedrich von Hayek (Valdes,
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1995). From the mid-1970s, this group of Chilean economists assumed positions of leadership in
the military dictatorship’s ministries and planning centers.
The school reform instituted a so-called “neo-liberal” governance education model based on
privatization, deregulation, and commodification by the establishment of quasi-markets through
decentralization, free choice of schools, and education vouchers, coupled with the introduction of
national large-scale assessments.
The first key element of the reform was decentralization (municipalizacion). The administra-
tion of public schools was transferred to the municipalities (municipalidades). The traditional
escuelas publicas (public schools) became escuelas and liceos municipales, as they are still called
today (Alarcon, 2017a).
The second key element was the introduction of a voucher system. Under the ley de subven-
ciones (subsidy law) (Decree 3476) of 1980, private and public schools received a per capita con-
tribution or subsidy, according to monthly attendance (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1980a). In line
with Milton Friedman’s voucher program, this was aimed at encouraging the creation of an edu-
cation market where public and private schools would compete for parental choice (Friedman,
2005 [1962]). According to the discourse, the ensuing competition between the schools would not
only promote cost efficiency, but also the educational quality of schools in the long term.
In addition to the removal of bureaucratic hurdles and the introduction of tax benefits (exen-
ciones tributarias), requirements for private school owners (sostenedores) were drastically reduced
(Corvalan et al., 2009, 160). In addition, subsidized private schools could work for profit and
were not accountable for the use of public funds (Bellei, 2016, 233–234). Moreover, in 1988, with
the introduction of the so-called financiamiento compartido, subsidized private schools, which
were previously fee-free, could charge school fees, but only with parental consent (Saavedra
Facusse, 2013, 10–11).
The third key element of the reform was that private educational provision and choice were
legally and constitutionally protected under the formula of the parental right to educate their chil-
dren. The 1980 Constitution established under the military dictatorship and, with modifications,
still in force today, enshrined the parents’ “right to choose” schools for their children (Ministerio
del Interior, 1980). In addition, the legal weight of the traditional principle of libertad de ense-
~nanza (freedom of education) has been increased in favor of private school provision (Ministerio
del Interior, 1980). This principle refers to the right to set up and operate private schools (mostly
Catholic), as well as non-governmental supervision of these schools (Toro Caceres, 2015, 44–47).
A fourth key element of the program was the close link between school competition and exter-
nal assessment of student achievement. In 1988 the reformers set up a national large-scale test
called SIMCE (Sistema de Medicion de la Calidad de la Educacion), which is still used as a quality
control system for the education system (Guzman, 1989; Benveniste, 2002). The media buzz sur-
rounding the annual publication of school rankings with SIMCE data has been instrumental in
building a positive image of private schools.
The transition to democracy took place in 1990 based on a negotiated pact which included the
preservation of the institutional and constitutional framework of the dictatorship (Verger, 2016).
The various governments of the center-left coalition Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia
attempted to mitigate the unequal effects of the “education market” through compensation pro-
grams for the poor (Verger, 2016). However, they left the principles of the model unchanged
(Corvalan, Carrasco, & Garcıa-Huidobro, 2016, 44). It was precisely this exclusive compensatory
logic that the governing coalition of the Nueva Mayorıa intended to overcome, at least in a rhet-
orical sense.
A structural result of the reform was the extension of a specific type of private school: the sub-
sidized private schools (escuelas privadas subvencionadas), which received state subsidies and
thus accommodated children from the middle and lower classes. These schools should be distin-
guished from the colegios, which function largely without government support, charge school fees,
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and could generally be categorized as elite schools. This latter category of private schools
remained untouched by the reform and they are still attended by a minority, i.e., 7%, of the total
student body (Corvalan et al., 2009, 63).
The Reform Agenda
Michelle Bachelet’s educational reform agenda was part of the so-called “tres grandes reformas”
(three large reforms), a reform package which, besides education, addressed areas that had
remained virtually untouched since the end of the military dictatorship (1973–1990): the tax and
electoral systems and the constitution. This reform package is to be interpreted as the result of
the aforementioned student movement, that emerged in 2006 and reemerged in 2011 (Stromquist
& Sanyal, 2013; Alarcon, 2017b). As part of a broad social mobilization process, this movement
branded the Chilean education system as an “apartheid system” (Asamblea Coordinadora de
Estudiantes Secundarios (ACES), 2012). But additional political pressure came from abroad.
Several OECD studies (2004, 2011a) pointed to the same inequality and segregation effects of
Chilean education. For example, in 2011 the organization noted that, among all the countries par-
ticipating in PISA 2009, Chile had the highest rates of social segregation in both private and pub-
lic schools and significant differences in performance between socio-economically diverse
students (OECD, 2011a). The fact that the Andean country was the first South American member
state to join the OECD in 2010 increased that external reform pressure.
First of all, Bachelets’ reform agenda showed clear intentions to de-commodify education. This
was firstly, by defining “segregation” and “inequality”, as well as the diminished “educational
quality”, as a basic problem (Bachelet, 2013, 16). Secondly, by defining that education no longer
had to be considered a “consumer good” but a “derecho social” (social right) (Bachelet, 2013, 17).
Thirdly, by placing concepts and ideas as social rights, elimination of profit-making, and free
education, taken from the student movement, at the center of the agenda (Asamblea
Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (ACES), 2012, 4–8, Bachelet, 2013, 16–21).
Furthermore, the reform debate was accompanied by a rhetoric that questioned the basis of
the neo-liberal governance model. For example, Jaime Quintana, senator for the government
coalition, in the March 25, 2014 issue of daily El Mercurio metaphorically compared the reform
enthusiasm of the governing coalition with a “retroexcavadora” [backhoe] that would “destroy”
the “foundations” of the “neo-liberal model” (Vega, von Baer, & Toro, 2014). Minister of
Education Nicolas Eyzaguirre explained at a press conference on April 17, 2014 that the aim of
education reform was to put an end to the existing “paradigm of education” (CNN Chile, 2014a).
The reform agenda was based on the following pillars: first, subsidized private schools should
no longer be allowed to charge school fees (“no al copago”). The basic argument was that fees
contributed to increasing segregation without significantly improving the quality of education
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 5). It should be noted that charging fees
was a common practice in these schools. The amount of the monthly school fee was between
1.50 and 118 euros, with an average of 24 euros. The average monthly income of the families of
these schools was between 640 and 680 euros, considering that the corresponding cost of living
for that year was estimated at 960 euros (Samelson & Kamin, 1975, 56). The reform strategy
envisaged that the state itself would compensate for the lacking parental contributions with higher
subsidies (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 5).
The second basic point was the banning of student selection (“no a la seleccion”). The argu-
ment was that the prohibition of selection and any form of social “discrimination” would not
only ensure the principle of parental choice of school, but also promote a “more inclusive”, more
cohesive (“mas cohesionada”) and more democratic society (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de
Chile (BCN), 2015, 7). In addition, the abolition of student selection would contribute to a higher
quality of education, as schools would be forced to form more heterogeneous classrooms that
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would improve their education processes (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN),
2015, 7). In fact, in addition to socio-economic selection, the most subsidized private schools, as
well as public schools, imposed academic requisites such as entrance exams, previous year’s
grades, personality reports, intelligence tests (Godoy, Salazar, & Trevi~no, 2014, 4). It was also con-
troversial that in the most of subsidized private schools, these practices began at elementary or
kindergarten age (Godoy et al., 2014, 4). The project therefore stipulated that schools should not
impose requisites either on academic performance or on family, religious, or socio-economic con-
ditions. Registration of school applicants should be organized through a central system by the
Ministry of Education. In the case of increased demand, selection should be done at random
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 7).
The third pillar of the reform agenda was the elimination of profit-making (“fin al lucro”). At
that time, most subsidized private schools were for-profit schools (El Mercurio, 2014). The basic
problem, it was argued, was that profit-making and education would follow contradictory logics:
the possibility of profit would lead school authorities to focus on maximizing and redirecting eco-
nomic resources rather than improving education (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile
(BCN), 2015, 8–9). Referring to several empirical studies, it was pointed out that these schools
would not have a higher educational quality than nonprofit schools, or indeed that it would even
be worse (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 8–9). The project foresaw that
private schools should become non-profit institutions (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile
(BCN), 2015, 25). Those school owners who did not want to follow this strategy would have to
turn their institutions into private elite schools (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile
(BCN), 2015, 27).
The Controversial Policy-Making Debate
Few debates proved to be as contentious as the parliamentary discussion surrounding the “ley de
inclusion”. Compared to the other legislative projects of the Bachelet government, the parliamen-
tary discussion was quite long, at 13months and 9 days (Holz & Medel, 2017, 135–136). Due to
the tough opposition of the right-wing opposition, the bill was modified by numerous amend-
ments introduced during the course of the debate. The opposition even went to the
Constitutional Court to impugn the constitutionality of the draft bill.
It was also striking that a relatively large number of civil society actors participated in the dis-
cussion: a total of 111 organizations and individuals presented their views during the first reading
of the bill before the lower house of parliament (Camara de Diputados) and 56 during the second
reading in the Senate (Holz & Medel, 2017, 137). The media coverage (print media, television,
radio, and internet) also revealed the controversial character of the debate (Molina Monasterios,
2017, 200). However, it is significant that the media presented a predominantly negative perspec-
tive of the reform agenda (Molina Monasterios, 2017, 200).
The controversial nature of the debate was fundamentally due to specific power constellations
linked to a profound ideological conflict. In the context of this conflict, various actors faced off
with each other, but strategic alliances were also formed. The most important actors were the
governing coalition Nueva Mayorıa, which included, among others, the Christian Democrats, the
Socialists, and the Communists; the right-wing opposition coalition Chile Vamos composed
mainly of the parties Renovacion Nacional and Union Democrata Independiente; as well as repre-
sentatives of the student movement, such as the Confederacion de Estudiantes de Chile
(CONFECH), Asamblea Coordinadora de Estudiantes Secundarios (ACES), and Confederacion de
Estudiantes Secundarios de Chile (CONES), which were situated on the left of the polit-
ical spectrum.
The right-wing opposition coalition formed strategic alliances with civil society actors such as
the private school association Colegios Particulares de Chile (CONACEP), established in 1977;
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think tanks, such as the Centro de Estudios Publicos and Libertad y Desarrollo; as with a private-
sector parents association known as Confederacion de Padres y Apoderados de Colegios
Particulares (CONFEPA). But the Catholic Church, as the most important educational institution
in the private sector, was also part of this alliance. In addition to ideological motivations, the
church fought, like the private school owners, for economic interests.
However, considering that the governing coalition had majorities in both chambers, the
lengthy duration of the policy-making debate seems somewhat surprising. The problem was that
the reform agenda itself provoked controversy even within the governing coalition. In particular,
some representatives of the Christian Democratic Party were skeptical about the reform agenda,
because of their ideological proximity to the Catholic Church, and also because some politicians
were school owners themselves (El Mostrador, 2014a).
In the parliamentary discussion, Chile Vamos wanted to leave the foundations and rules of the
education system untouched, especially those of the subsidized private schools. Regarding the ter-
mination of school fees, this right-wing coalition explicitly advocated their preservation (Holz &
Medel, 2017). Opposing the prohibition of student selection, they argued for the importance of
upholding the meritocratic principle (Holz & Medel, 2017, 142). In terms of ending profit-
making, they proposed regulating, but not eliminating it (Holz & Medel, 2017, 169). In parallel,
representatives of CONACEP and CONFEPA organized rallies and explicitly protested for the
right of parental choice, for the principle of profit-making in schools and, quite peculiarly, for
the “right to pay school fees” (Serrano, 2014).
While the right-wing opposition criticized the reform agenda because of its “radical” nature,
the student associations questioned it because of its “moderation”. The basic objection was that
the reform agenda merely intended a “makeover” (maquillaje) of the existing educational model
(Areyuna, 2014). The “historic opportunity” of change, as expressed by CONFECH President
Melissa Sepulveda during a massive rally on June, 10 2014, would be lost. She criticized that the
reform agenda focused exclusively on the subsidized private school sector and left public schools
untouched (Areyuna, 2014). The basic demands of the movement, as Sepulveda put it, were “the
defense, preservation, and strengthening of public education” (Areyuna, 2014). The movement
exclusively understood “educacion publica” (public education) exclusively the escuelas municipales,
that is, schools which were administered by municipalities.
A Most Improbable Identification? The Netherlands as a “Reference Society”
As mentioned, the reference construction of the Netherlands is unusual for the Chilean context
and can therefore be described as improbable. The Netherlands only appeared in the context of
educational policy-making debates in the middle of the 2000s, but would become one of the most
cited examples in this policy-making debate (Parcerisa & Verger, 2019). Actually, In the parlia-
mentary debate it was the most frequently cited example, although there were also references to
Finland and the United States, among other countries (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile
(BCN), 2015). So, why the Netherlands? The Netherlands represents not only a different cultural
tradition but also a language that is almost unknown in the Latin American context. Also, unlike
other European countries or the United States, there are no close economic, scientific, and/or cul-
tural alliances with Chile. Similarly, in terms of the educational history of both countries, there
were only minor encounters, exchange processes and cooperation. In fact, between the nineteenth
century and the middle of the twentieth century, France, Germany and the United States were
the main educational reference societies (Alarcon, 2014). What characterized the Chilean con-
struction of the Netherlands therefore was distance and even relative ignorance. Paradoxically,
relative ignorance, that is “not knowing too much about the country”, makes attribution strategies
easier (Waldow, 2010, 507). This ignorance or detachment also left Chilean reformers with few
preexisting presuppositions or even stereotypes. This shows a contrast to the dynamics of the
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reference construction of East Asian PISA top scorers in Australia, Germany, and South Korea
(Waldow, Takayama, & Sung, 2014).
The construction of the Netherlands as a “reference society” also seems to be improbable
because the country does not rank among the top scorers in ILSA or PISA, even though it is con-
sidered an “overall high performer” (OECD, 2014). For example, the Netherlands came 10th in
both the 2009 and 2012 PISA tests (OECD, 2010, 5; OECD, 2014c, 8). Moreover, in comparison
to Finland, the Dutch educational system is not a usual “reference society” in the context of
ILSAs. In 2000 the former was widely presented as an international “reference society” because of
its top scores in PISA (Waldow, 2010, 499).
Therefore, of course, the question arises as to why the Chilean reformers did not orient them-
selves toward Finland and instead selected the Netherlands. The answer is that PISA certainly
functioned as a factor in the Chilean reference construction of the Netherlands. In other words,
academic quality and efficiency, which PISA claims to attest at the international level, were
important selection criteria, but they were not the only ones. An even more decisive criterion
that was considered was the governance model of the education system. As already mentioned,
identification processes are based on a recognition operation, that is a mirroring process. Thus,
the only countries similar to Chile in structure, organization, and, more specifically, the propor-
tion of students attending private schools are, in descending order, Macao-China, Hong Kong-
China, Dubai, Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland (OECD, 2012, 18). The fact that the selection
fell to the Netherlands and not to Asian countries may well be firstly, due to Chile’s historical
orientation towards Western Europe (Alarcon, 2014). Asian countries have so far not functioned
as model states in education. Secondly, the proportions of students attending private schools
in the Netherlands and Chile was very similar: 66% vs. 58% (OECD, 2012, 18). Thirdly, state-
subsidized private schools have a special significance in both countries. Fourthly, the Netherlands
was preferred over other European countries, such as Belgium or Ireland, because only the
Netherlands shared a key feature with Chilean education: the legal financial equality between pri-
vate and public schools. In the Netherlands, this legal equality has existed since 1917 (Franken &
Vermeer, 2017, 3), while in Chile it was established during the educational reform of the military
dictatorship (Ministerio de Hacienda, 1980a; Ministerio de Educacion, 1990). The identification
process was complete. The Dutch school system was the only country in the world, with which
the Chilean school system shared the following attributes: high private school provision; the cen-
trality of state-subsidized private schools; the principle of parents’ free choice; and the constitu-
tional equality between private and public schools.
The “Dutch Argument”
One of the pioneers among Chilean admirers of the Netherlands was the well-known Chilean
education researcher and politician Jose Joaquın Brunner. He is considered one of the intellectual
originators of the educational reforms launched by the Concertacion coalition during the 1990s.
As early as March 6, 2011, that is, three years before the policy-making debate, he pointed, in the
news article El Mercurio, at that common node between the Chilean and Dutch school system:
the legal equality between subsidized private and public (municipal) schools. He called this equal-
ity principle “igualdad de trato entre lo publico y privado” [equality of treatment between the pub-
lic and private sphere] (Brunner, 2011). According to the second operation of identification,
namely that of assimilation, Brunner argued that the “Dutch model” should promote an
“institutional learning process” within the reform discussion (Brunner, 2011). He underlined the
importance of the equality principle arguing that this equality should be extended in the sense of
an “igualdad de trato y de exigencias” (equality of treatment and requirements between the public
and private sphere) (Brunner, 2011) in order to counteract discrimination in the municipal sector.
Brunner also used the Dutch example to legitimize the concept of a “public educational system”
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(Brunner, 2011). This term covered both the escuelas municipales and private subsidized schools.
This discourse strategy would run like a common thread through the entire reform discussion.
Interestingly, the right-wing opposition not only welcomed this strategy, but also embraced it.
The student movement, however, understood only the escuelas municipales as being “educacion
publica”, as already mentioned.
As part of the assimilation strategy, the “Dutch argument” was aimed at leaving the structural
foundations of the Chilean quasi-market untouched, while changing certain rules of this quasi-
market. For example, in a news article article in La Tercera “>Como es el modelo escolar
holandes?” (What does the Dutch school model look like?) published on July 27, 2014, it was
stated that the “experience” of the Netherlands is “regarded by Chile as an example from which
lessons could be taken” (Mu~noz, 2014). Gonzalo Mu~noz, head of general education at the
Ministry of Education, whose party, Revolucion Democratica was close to the governing coalition,
also argued in this direction (Mu~noz, 2014). According to Mu~noz, the “Dutch example” is “super
importante” (extremely important) for the education reform, because unlike Chile, not only
should the “rights” of state and private school authorities be equal, but also their “duties”
(Mu~noz, 2014). In the Netherlands, unlike Chile, private school operators are not allowed “to
profit, to discriminate, to charge school fees” (Mu~noz, 2014).
PISA was certainly used in a discursive manner to legitimize the selection of the Netherlands.
For example, in the context of the reform discussion, PISA was evoked as a discursive projection
of a “good educational system” (Waldow, 2010, 498), or specifically of an “efficient” one, that is,
PISA was associated with “collective utility oriented” patterns (Nikolai & Rothe, 2017, 131). In
this line of reasoning, the cited news article attributed academic “effectiveness” according to
“international standards” to the Netherlands (Mu~noz, 2014). In the 2012 PISA study it was
argued that, the country was “among the 15 best countries” and “surpassed several other
developed countries in academic performance” (Mu~noz, 2014). Interestingly, Chilean reformers
showed similar arguments to economists of the World Bank, who praised the private provision
and school autonomy of the Dutch system as well as its good performance in PISA
(Patrinos, 2013).
The Netherlands as a “Normalization” Argument
First of all, the Dutch model was used in connection with a “scandalization” strategy by highlight-
ing the weaknesses of the educational system as a result of comparison (Steiner-Khamsi, 2003).
Secondly, the reformers used a “normalization” argument by claiming that the Chilean school sys-
tem shares a world-wide exceptionality or uniqueness with the Dutch system, but is “abnormal”
in the international context (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015). It is
“abnormal” in the sense that it has certain unique, undesirable, and inadequate features, that do
not even exist in the Dutch example. Thus, the reformers argued, a “normalization” of the exist-
ing educational model is necessary. In this regard, the Minister of Education, Nicolas Eyzaguirre,
used the Dutch example in the Senate debate of January 22, 2015 to point out the “uniqueness”
of the Chilean model. Eyzaguirre spoke of a Chilean “hyperliberalism” which should
be normalized:
[… ] It is an almost unique model in the world. In fact, regarding parents choice, it is much more liberal
then the freest systems in the world, such as Belgium and the Netherlands (Republica de Chile, 2015b, 53).
The Christian Democratic senator Ignacio Walker argued similarly in the Senate debate of
January 21, 2015: “Chile is the only country on planet Earth that allows profit from public funds,
school fees, and student selection” (Republica de Chile, 2015a, 47).
It was not only reformers, but also scholars that used the “uniqueness” argument to legitimize
the reform. This was the case of the study “Apoyo publico a escuelas privadas. Casos nacionales y
lecciones para Chile” (Public support for private schools. National cases and lessons for Chile) by
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the researchers Cristian Bellei and Carolina Trivelli of the Centro de Investigacion Avanzada en
Educacion de la Universidad de Chile (Bellei & Trivelli, 2014). The study was compiled on behalf
of the Inter-American Bank for Development, IBD, and referred to seven national cases in which
private schools are subsidized by the state: the Netherlands, Belgium, the United States,
Colombia, Sweden, England, and Canada. According to Bellei, “the Chilean case is one of the
extremes in market-driven privatization policies”, thus, “Chile could well adopt some of the basic
rules of the Dutch model” (Bellei & Trivelli, 2014).
Educational researcher Gregory Elacqua, then director of the Institute of Political Sciences of
the Faculty of Economics at Universidad Diego Portales, also declared, in a presentation to the
Senate Education Commission on January 20, 2015, that the reform agenda should follow the
example of the Netherlands in order to “correct” the “Chilean experiment”. (Biblioteca del
Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 1045). “Experiment” was the description of the excep-
tional features of the Chilean education system among the OECD countries. In no other country,
with the exception of Sweden, are private schools allowed to make profits from government sub-
sidies, and in no other country can these schools charge compulsory fees (Biblioteca del
Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 1045).
As already mentioned, coupled with the argument of “uniqueness”, the concept of the Chilean
“anomie” was cited. This key concept was used by several government representatives, such as
Education Minister Eyzaguirre in a television interview in July 2014 (Gallardo, 2014) and by the
members of the government coalition Carlos Campos and Maya Fernandez (Biblioteca del
Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 385, 419). However, pro-government representatives of
progressive think tanks and researchers also referred to this concept. For example, in an interview
given to news channel 24H in March 2014, Mario Waissbluth of the social-democratic think tank
Educacion 2020 linked this anomie argument to moral categories: Chile is “the most disgustingly
segregated and classist country in the world” (Balart, 2014). Furthermore, he explicitly used the
Dutch example as a political reassurance strategy (Balart, 2014). He questioned the opposition’s
“terror campaign” and appeased critics by stating that the reform project did not seek to end sub-
sidized private schools, but was a reform that would follow the “modelo holandes” (Dutch model)
(Balart, 2014). The “normalization” argument was used here in the sense of a “humanization”
strategy, with the aim of making the Chilean education system worthy of human dignity
(menschenw€urdig).
Researcher Bellei would also make critical references to the “situation of anomaly due to an
extreme market orientation” of the Chilean education system (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional
de Chile (BCN), 2015, 102), underlining that both Dutch and Belgian education were “efficient”
and could be “replicated” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 637).
In summary, it can be stated that the “Dutch argument” was cited in order to present the edu-
cation reform agenda fundamentally as a “normalization” and “humanization” strategy by remov-
ing from the Chilean educational model those elements shown to be “unique” and “immoral”:
profit-making, student selection, and fees.
Excluding History
It is striking how references to history, and in particular educational history, were almost invari-
ably excluded in the Chilean reference construction of the Netherlands. Thus, there was virtually
no discussion of the fact that the high level of private school provision in the Netherlands and
the equivalent status of private and public schools under the constitution, was the result of a legal
compromise solution in 1917 (Franken & Vermeer, 2017). This compromise solution was the cul-
mination of a long religious conflict, in particular a school struggle (schoolstrijd) between
Protestant and Catholic, but also secular forces which took place between 1848 and 1917
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(Franken & Vermeer, 2017): a conflict rather alien to a country with a far-reaching and dominant
Catholic cultural tradition like Chile.
The dual education system of the Netherlands still consists of public and private, mainly reli-
gious, schools (Franken & Vermeer, 2017, 3). Public schools, that is, those owned and operated
by a public authority, in particular municipalities, are called openbare (literally “public”) (Sturm,
Groenendijk, Kruithof, & Rens, 1998, 284). These schools are, as far as their administration is
concerned, equivalent to the Chilean escuelas municipales. As in the Chilean case, these schools
must maintain religious and political neutrality, but unlike the Chilean case, they can follow cer-
tain pedagogical currents. The other category of Dutch schools is bijzonder (literally “special”)
and, because of their administration, they are understood as “private” and mostly
“denominational” schools (Sturm et al., 1998, 284). They are run by boards of various local
organizations, such as parents’ associations, as is customary in evangelical schools, or by the
church and other religious institutions, as in the case of Roman Catholic schools (Sturm et al.,
1998, 284). These local private educational institutions are financed according to their numbers
of students at the same level as public schools (Sturm et al., 1998, 284). These institutions are
equivalent to the Chilean escuelas privadas subvencionadas, although most of these schools are
not denominational.
This dual school organization has its roots in the revision of the Dutch constitution of 1848
(Franken & Vermeer, 2017, 3). This revision recognized the principle of “freedom of education”
in terms of religious freedom. Following this principle, the establishment of schools was no longer
the sole prerogative of the state, and religious groups now also had the right to establish their
own schools (Franken & Vermeer, 2017, 3). However, unlike state schools, the fact that private
schools did not receive state funding was condemned as “unequal treatment” by denominational
groups, especially Catholics and Protestants, with regard to the principle of “freedom of educa-
tion” (Franken & Vermeer, 2017, 3). This situation led to the afore mentioned school struggle
(schoolstrijd), in which those religious groups aspired to equal funding for religious schools. After
several decades, this conflict was settled in 1917 by a political compromise or pacification
(Pacificatie van 1917) between Christian political parties and the Liberals and Socialists (Franken
& Vermeer, 2017, 3). This agreement established equal funding for public and private religious
schools (Franken & Vermeer, 2017, 3).
Interestingly, the Chilean actors did not say much about the principle of verzuiling (pillari-
zation) either. This concept refers to a confessional justified particularism connected with this
compromise solution, in which religiously, socially, and culturally defined groups, for example
Christian-Protestant, Roman Catholic, liberal and socialist, live side-by-side (pillar) and have
their own social organizations (political parties, trade unions, business associations, profes-
sional groups, news articles, banks, etc.), and especially schools (Franken & Vermeer, 2017,
2). This structure of the entire public life after denominational and ideological aspects dates
back to the nineteenth century and is now considered a thing of the past, except in the
school system. It seems paradoxical, therefore, that the Chilean reformers were guided by an
educational model that was described as a “voluntary apartheid in education” (Sturm et al.,
1998, 288) because of the maintenance of the pillarization principle. In fact, beyond the his-
torical tradition of pillarization, recent research has shown high rates of school segregation,
connected with residential segregation in large Dutch cities (Boterman, 2018). Therefore, the
Chilean orientation towards the Netherlands seems to be contradictory, because the reformers
had defined the reduction of social segregation as a basic objective of their agenda (Bachelet,
2013, 16).
All in all, it should be noted that the Chilean tradition of education and history played no
important role, either as a criterion for selection or as an argument for orientation towards the
Netherlands. As the brief historical review of Dutch educational history shows, there were
important differences between the two educational traditions, such as pillarization as a social
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principle and the compromise of 1917. What is more, the identification with the Netherlands
seems almost paradoxical with regard to the reform goal of Bachelet’s government to reduce the
“alarming levels” of social segregation (Bachelet, 2013, 16).
The Conflicting Finnish Example
The consensus-building character of the Dutch education model should clearly contrast with the
“uncomfortable” Finnish example. The Chilean reference to Finland is far from surprising. As
already mentioned this country was constructed as an international model because of its top
scores in PISA (Waldow, 2010, 499). Moreover, Finnish education has been praised as a top
perfomer together with high levels of social equity (OECD 2013). Therefore, of course, the ques-
tion arises as to why the Chilean reformers did not orient themselves to Finland and instead
selected the Netherlands.
As already stated, during the parliamentary discussion, Finland was one of the leading
“reference societies”, being evoked by both center-left and right-wing politicians (Parcerisa &
Verger, 2019). The latter, however, used the Finnish example to slow down the reform agenda,
the former to legitimize it.
Interestingly, during the most heated phase of the reform discussion, in November 2014, a 30-
member delegation traveled to Finland, and not the Netherlands. Following an invitation from
the Finnish government, the Minister of Education, Nicolas Eyzaguirre, representatives of various
think tanks, government officials, parliamentarians of both coalitions, educational researchers and
representatives of the teachers’ association Colegio de Profesores visited the country. The members
of parliament also included former key figures of the student movement, such as Camila Vallejo
and Giorgio Jackson (El Mostrador, 2014b).
It could have been the beginning of a process of reference construction and educational
cooperation, but instead the Finnish example caused some discomfort, both among the govern-
ment officials and the representatives of the right-wing coalition. Actually, the fact that the
reform goals, namely fee-free schools, no student selection, an no profit-making, were imple-
mented in Finland for decades (OECD, 2014b), was left almost unmentioned by them. For
example, Minister of Education Eyzaguirre relied on moderation during his stay: “[… ] one
has to take a good deal of care in order to adapt the lessons we are learning here because we
are a quite different people, we have other rules” (Ojeda, 2014). In other words, identification
with Finland is difficult because there are too many differences. Secondly, their positions
revealed a highly selective perception of the Finnish education system. According to their dis-
course, only one element was worth being imitated: teacher training. In fact, Eyzaguirre
defined teacher training as the only possible “space for collaboration” between the two coun-
tries: “They are world-class in this respect and I believe we can derive some useful experiences
in a relatively short term” (Ojeda, 2014). The same thematic focus on Finnish teacher training
was revealed by the right-wing opposition senator Andres Allamand. He referred favorably to
the social “prestige” and “autonomy” of Finnish teachers, traits that Chilean teachers would
lack (Ojeda, 2014). However, he used the Finnish example to criticize the goal of the discussed
education reform. So, he declared: “The reform should have started with the teachers!”
(Ojeda, 2014).
By contrast, for the left-wing spectrum, especially the student movement, Finland was held up as
a model since the massive reform protests of 2011 (La Nacion, 2011). That year, the president of
the FECH, Camila Vallejo, told TV channel CNN Chile in an interview that the need for a “fee-
free, democratic, and quality education system” was not “utopian”: it existed in Finland (La Nacion,
2011). To Vallejo, Finland was therefore completely different than for the government or the right-
wing opposition coalition (La Nacion, 2011). She understood Finland as an example of “almost
100% public education”, high quality and free education (La Nacion, 2011).
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Congressman Giorgio Jackson also expressed his admiration for the Finnish example after
returning from the Finnish pilgrimage. In an interview to CNN Chile on November 10, 2014, he
declared that Finland’s top scores in PISA and its low performance variance make it suitable for
an education system with “more equity and quality at the same time” (CNN Chile, 2014b).
Unlike the Minister of Education, he emphasized that in Finland, the Chilean reform goals had
been implemented a long time ago, that is “for 40 years”: “fee-free education for all” excellence”
“no profit-making” and “no access discrimination” (CNN Chile, 2014b).
In summary, it can be stated that the “Finnish argument”, in contrast to the “Dutch
argument”, mainly revealed the existing dissent among the various political actors. This is striking
considering that Finland is not only a top scorer in PISA, but has also been implementing the
Chilean reform goals for years. Following Gita Steiner-Khamsi (2014), the reformers and the rep-
resentatives of Chile Vamos showed little receptiveness for lesson-drawing from Finland, using
the “argument of fundamental differences” by alleging that the contexts were not sufficiently
comparable “to learn a lesson” (163).
Reference Societies as a Compromise?
But why and for what purpose was the Netherlands designated as a new model state? The argu-
ment of this paper is that the “Dutch argument” was above all a compromise solution. Thus, in
the eyes of the reformers, it represented an ideal “middle ground” between an “efficient” but
socially equitable and therefore “humanized” education system and the conservation of the exist-
ing neo-liberal governance model. Especially regarding the right-wing opposition coalition, the
governing coalition, whether for pragmatic or ideological reasons, expressed willingness to com-
promise. Firstly, this willingness to compromise is shown by the fact that the governing coalition
adhered from the outset, that is, even before the reform discussion, to certain basic principles of
the governance model. These basic principles, which are found both in the government program
and in the draft bill, and refer to the Dutch example, are, on the one hand, the principle of finan-
cial equality between public and subsidized private schools in the context of “equality of
treatment” (Bachelet, 2013, 16–21; Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 3–29),
and on the other hand, the principle of freedom of education, specially that of parents choice
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile (BCN), 2015, 6).
Secondly, the willingness to compromise is revealed by the content of the law itself, specifically
in regard to student selection (Ministerio de Educacion, 2015).
Certainly, there are victories of the governing coalition.
Thus, following the Dutch model, it decided on both the abolition of school fees and profit-
making. Furthermore, it was also established that student selection based on socio-economic and
academic criteria would be eliminated (Ministerio de Educacion, 2015). But an important conces-
sion by the reformers was the abolition of student selection on an academic basis. Interestingly,
the right-wing opposition coalition cited the Dutch example against this measure. In the article
“Seleccion y Discriminacion” from November 16, 2014, Arturo Fontaine, longtime president of the
right-wing think-tank Centro de Estudios Publicos, argued that the Dutch school system, which
was “among the top 10 in the PISA test”, used a system of academic selection (Fontaine &
Urzua, 2014). Indeed, the OECD attested that among the OECD countries, the Dutch school sys-
tem (along with the Swiss one) had “one of the greatest degrees of student selection across
schools, grades, and programs” (OECD, 2011b, 82). Finally, and according to the objections of
the opposition, the law stipulated that schools with special profiles (sports, music, etc.) may select
up to 30% of their students (Ministerio de Educacion, 2015). The same applies to the so-called
liceos emblematicos, that is, traditional public liceos with high academic requirements. The selec-
tion, however, would be based on rankings, that is, the ranking of students in their previous
schools. Another concession made by the reformers was gradual implementation. For example,
student selection will not be fully abolished in the entire school system until 2020.
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Conclusion: Beyond Pisa? “Reference Societies” and Specific Local Power
Constellations
This paper addressed a hitherto unprecedented policy-making debate that took place during the
center-left government of Michelle Bachelet (2014–2018). The context of the debate was an inten-
sive phase of crisis. At the center of this discussion was a reform agenda that, for the first time in
decades, aimed at a “paradigmatic” transformation of a neo-liberal governance model based on
privatization, deregulation and commodification. This debate proved to be very special because in
its context, it constructed a new “reference society”: the Netherlands.
In a thematic sense, the paper showed how controversial, complex, and multi-layered this
incisive reform discussion was regarding that “model country of neo-liberalism” (Ettel &
Zsch€apitz, 2016). The Netherlands represented a stopgap solution for a reform policy that had
little room for maneuver due to the existing power constellations regarding political opposition
from left and right, as well as structural conditions. This limited scope was due first to consti-
tutional restraints. These limitations made it difficult to focus on the impoverished public sec-
tor. However, the lack of margin was also due to the special characteristics of the opponents to
the reform. The explosive power connection between political-ideological opposition on the part
of the right-wing and individual Christian Democratic politicians, the Catholic Church and the
representation of strictly economic-corporate interests on the part of private-school associations
should not be underestimated. Another element is the existing structure of the Chilean educa-
tion system: meanwhile, private schools have reached the center of society. A reversal of this
development would be exceedingly complex, also due to the constitutional factors mentioned.
Likewise, the attempt to establish a new constitution would fail during the Bachelet govern-
ment. Linked to this, a cultural factor acts as another obstacle to reform. The fact that a part
of society defended ideas such as “private is better”, the principle of free parental choice, and
the “right to pay school fees”, is also due to a cultural change in mentality that reformers had
not initially recognized.
From a methodological-theoretical point of view, particularly with regard to processes of
externalization and the construction of reference societies, this paper confirmed that PISA,
specifically the “international ranking policy” (Steiner-Khamsi, 2004), acts as a significant
externalization promoter in national debates (Lingard, 2011, 369). At the same time, however,
the Chilean case also shows that PISA is not a sufficient factor to explain external reference
constructions (Waldow, 2017; Waldow et al., 2014). In this sense, Finnish education, despite
being at the top in PISA results, having high social equity levels, and having implemented
the reform objectives, could not operate as an international reference for the Chilean reform
agenda. Instead, an education system was chosen which, while “achieving high education per-
formance and equity” (OECD, 2014) shows high levels of school segregation (Boterman,
2018). The paper thus confirmed the idea that, in addition to PISA, specific local factors, in
particular power relations between the various policy actors, also play a decisive role in the
dynamic of reference construction (Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2018). These factors refer to
an ideologically-politically motivated controversy between the government coalition and the
opposition, coupled with the economic interests of certain civil society actors such as private
school associations, as well as structural constellations and regulations of the Chilean educa-
tion system. From a critical comparative perspective, local power relations should be therefore
included in the analysis of externalization processes, in general and in PISA translation in
particular (Steiner-Khamsi & Waldow, 2018).
This paper methodically linked the concept of “reference society” with that of “identification”,
with the aim of analyzing and explaining the mechanism of reference construction in more detail.
The notion of identification is useful in that it distinguishes between two mechanisms: identifica-
tion as recognition (mirroring) and identification as assimilation. The Chilean reformers therefore
chose the Dutch example because it is almost the only one in the world where they could
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recognize the structure, regulations and organization of Chilean education: high private school
provision, the centrality of state subsidized private schools, the principle of free parental choice,
and the constitutional equality between private and public schools. This mirroring was not pos-
sible with Finnish education, which is mostly based on public schooling. Furthermore, the Dutch
example provided an ideal source of assimilation since, in addition to the common features men-
tioned above, the leitmotif “no profit-making, student selection, and fees” of the reform agenda
had already been implemented. In contrast, the Finnish example provoked resistance from both
the governing coalition and the right-wing coalition, which would hinder a Chilean-Finnish learn-
ing process or limit it to teacher training (Steiner-Khamsi, 2014).
In summary, it can be stated that the selection of the Netherlands followed rather pragmatic-
strategic and utilitarian criteria. Therefore, the “Dutch argument” was mainly linked to perform-
ance-oriented efficiency and effectiveness. But some normative elements were also found in
relation to the “normalization” and “humanization” argument. The strategic and selective charac-
ter of the reference to the Netherlands, probably also plagued by relative ignorance, is confirmed
by exclusion of the education history and tradition of the Netherlands; from the principle of pilla-
rization to the compromise of 1917. It is also paradoxical in this respect that the orientation was
towards a highly segmented education system, although the basic goal of the reform was to over-
come the high social segregation.
Ultimately, I proposed the idea that the reference to the Dutch model ultimately served as a
compromise solution. With this thesis I wanted to answer the question of what function or pur-
pose the Dutch “reference society” adopted or fulfilled in the context of the reform discussion. In
my opinion, it was used as a discursive legitimization of one of the first attempts at reform the
Chilean educational governance model, but paradoxically also of its preservation. Specifically, the
“Dutch argument” was used as a “normalization” and “humanization” strategy, in order to take
from the Chilean educational model those elements defined as “exceptional”, “immoral”, and not
worthy of human dignity (profit-making, student selection and fees). The “Dutch argument”
therefore served the reformers in order to appease the vehement critics of the model, in particular
the student movement, who had a radical rhetoric. At the same time, the “Dutch argument”
served to allay its defenders, the right-wing opposition coalition, as well as certain interest groups
such as the private school associations, by proposing and passing a moderate law. In fact, a dis-
course coalition between center-left governmental actors and some right-wing actors was notable
in terms of considering the Netherlands as a “reference society”. The use of the “Dutch
argument” by right-wing actors as a means of preserving the neo-liberal governance education
model can be verified in the book by Arturo Fontaine, published a few years after the introduc-
tion of the law (Fontaine & Urzua, 2018).
Finally, the “Dutch argument” basically served to ensure the conservation of the market and
competition logic of the Chilean education model. In fact, the practice of state subsidies for
private institutions remains within the context of constitutional equality between private and
public schools. At the same time, the “Dutch argument” allowed certain rules of the govern-
ance model to be changed. Therefore, the neo-liberal basis of the Chilean governance model
has not been abandoned but tamed within the reform. Education was only partially de-
commodified.
Nevertheless, future studies should address the transnational multiplier effects of this policy-
making debate. To what extent did the Chilean debate on “education de-commodification”
(Verger, 2014) lead to similar discussions in other countries? And, did Chile itself operate as a
“reference society” in these countries? In addition, future studies should examine the unintended
side effects of the law. It can be anticipated that paradoxically the reform could lead to a strength-
ening of the market and competition logic. The abolition of school fees could even increase
enrollment in the subsidized private school sector. Parents who previously had no access to this
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type of education because of their low income could now choose private schools as they are free.
As a result, the escuelas municipales would lose even more students.
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